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The question
Cognitive neuroscience is yet to produce applications of major 
clinical impact. If its relative immaturity is to blame, we need 
merely wait. But if its approach is fundamentally ill-suited, we 
could be left waiting forever. We must therefore consider how 
well the means of cognitive neuroscience support translational 
ends. Such consideration cannot be expected to emerge sponta-
neously from the field itself, for neuroscience evolves under the 
selective pressure of supposed understanding, not the collateral 
of mechanistic insight translation is widely perceived to be. 
Nor may we presume the obstacles to translation to be pecu-
liar to each cognitive subfield and unlikely to be illuminated by 
a general analysis: it is possible they lie within the proximal, 
cardinal steps common to all of neuroscience. Here we examine 
this possibility, show it to be overwhelmingly likely, and outline 
how neuroscience must change if it is to deliver real-world patient 
impact.
Translation and individualisation
Most societies give primacy to the individual person, imposing 
collective interests only with reluctance. This is especially true 
of healthcare, where the object of clinical action is archetyp-
ally the individual and the group only secondarily. To take a 
striking example, we could overnight revolutionize popula-
tion outcomes in acute stroke by intervening with thrombolytic 
therapy at the kerbside, bypassing delays that hospital transfer 
for diagnostic computed tomographic scans inevitably introduce 
(Wardlaw et al., 1997). But however compelling the 
population statistics, such a manoeuvre is rendered uncon-
scionable by the resultant death or greater disability of the 
10% of patients with primary intracerebral haemorrhage 
(Qureshi et al., 2009). Even where the stakes are less sharply 
polarised, it remains difficult to implement any treatment whose 
individual benefit is only crudely probabilistic, for all inter-
ventions have a cost: both personal and financial. Moreover, 
since populations merely summarise effects on individuals, 
the greater the individual variation, the lesser the population-
level impact. Both constitutively and politically, translational 
success or failure is thus critically dependent on our ability to 
individualise our interventions.
How is individuality determined? Consider by way of illustra-
tion that most personal part of the body, the face (Figure 1). 
Though one feature may sometimes be uniquely idiosyn-
cratic, to distinguish a face from another generally requires the 
conjunction of many features, even when all redundancy is 
eliminated. Such irreducibly high intrinsic dimensionality is 
conveniently captured by the notion of minimum description 
length (Rissanen, 1978) – intuitively, the most compressed 
complete description of a system. This quantity sets a hard limit 
on the minimal complexity of any model that must distinguish 
one state or instance of a system from another to perform its 
task. No matter how clever the mathematics, a machine vision 
model tasked with (say) classifying the sex of a face will always 
perform badly when starved of input features because no small 
subset of features contains the necessary information; con-
versely, even a relatively unsophisticated model with sufficient 
capacity will perform well, given enough data (Parkhi et al., 
2015; Schroff et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2015). It should come 
as no surprise that face coding in the primate brain takes a 
high-dimensional approach, deriving identity by projecting a 
multiplicity of features onto a compacted representational space 
Figure 1. Dimensionality and individualisation. The face of the 
Roman Emperor Hostilian (top left) is poorly described by the 
canonical face of all Roman Emperors (top right), which is—by 
definition—not identical with any of the individual faces from 
which it is derived. Furthermore, the individuality of a face is better 
captured by a low-precision, high-dimensional parameterisation 
(bottom left), than it is by a high-precision, low-dimensional 
parameterisation such as the inter-pupillary distance (bottom 
right). The photograph of Hostilian is reproduced with the kind 
permission of Dr William Storage.
      Amendments from Version 1
We have added a note of clarification on the causal structure 
of neural systems with an analogy from residual networks. The 
section on modelling polymorphous systems now opens with a 
brief outline of the general approach. A citation to Thiebaut de 
Schotten, M., and Shallice, T. (2017). Identical, similar or different? 




Page 3 of 15
F1000Research 2019, 7:620 Last updated: 02 JAN 2019
(Chang & Tsao, 2017). Now our concern is not individuation 
simpliciter but the individuation of causal mechanisms of 
predictive or prescriptive utility. For this we need a causally 
constrained extension of the concept of minimal description 
length: what we here term a minimal causal field. To see how this 
is specified requires a brief examination of biological causality.
Neural causation
We have a natural intellectual predisposition to causal models 
with two cardinal features: economy and seriality (Hacker, 
2007). This is a consequence partly of reasoning by analogy and 
partly of practicability. The intelligible, mechanistically pellucid 
processes we observe in the non-organic world and exploit in the 
machines we build tend to have few parameters of causal sig-
nificance, arranged sequentially. It seems natural to apply the 
same approach to biology, indeed inevitable, for a causal model 
with (say) a thousand parameters is intellectually intractable. 
When we insist on identifying necessary and sufficient links 
within a more or less serial chain, it is because no other option 
has been open to us.
But whereas this notion of causation is adequate for understand-
ing simple, serially organised systems, it does not scale with 
complexity. In complex systems, where a multiplicity of factors 
is jointly brought to bear on the outcome, each individual 
factor becomes an insufficient but necessary part of a set of 
factors that are unnecessary but sufficient for the result: an INUS 
condition (Mackie, 1974). To give an adequately explanatory 
account it is necessary to specify a causal field of many such INUS 
conditional factors that interact in complex ways (see Figure 2).
Do neural systems require such a complexity of causal specifi-
cation? Consider the far simpler behaviour of artificial neural 
networks, such as deep-learning architectures in which layers 
of laterally connected units are hierarchically arranged in an 
end-to-end error-minimising stack (Goodfellow et al., 2016; 
LeCun et al., 2015). Taking the input-output transformation pro-
duced by such a network as its “function”, we can test the causal 
contribution of sets of network nodes by examining the functional 
consequences of deactivating them, essentially performing 
artificial neural network lesion-deficit mapping (Adolphs, 2016; 
Figure 2. Causal fields. Distributed causality is elegantly illustrated by the behaviour of artificial neural networks trained to transform an 
input into an output by optimising the weights of a stack of fully connected nodes. Here the input-output transformation is causally dependent 
on the nodes and their connections, for it cannot occur without most of them. But when the network is large, its dependence on any limited 
subset of nodes will be low. This is not because there is a reserve of unused nodes, but because the causality of the system is constitutionally 
distributed. Inactivating (in black) a set of nodes (large circles) or their connections (small circles) will thus degrade performance broadly in 
proportion to their number and not necessarily their identity. Causality thus becomes irreducible to any simple specification of necessity and 
sufficiency. Instead, each node becomes an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient set of factors: an INUS condition. 
An adequate description of the causality of the system as a whole then requires specification of the entire causal field of factors: no subset 
will do, and no strong ranking need exist between them. If the architecture of real neural networks makes such causality possible—and 
it certainly does—we need to be capable of modelling it. But this is more than just a theoretical possibility. It is striking that encouraging 
distributed causal architectures through dropping nodes or connections during training dramatically improves the performance of artificial 
neural networks. And, of course, real neural substrates often exhibit remarkable robustness to injury, a phenomenon conventionally construed 
as “reserve”, but since no part of the brain lies in wait, inactive, distributed causality is a more plausible explanation.
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Rorden & Karnath, 2004). When a trained network is subjected 
to such drop-out (Gal & Ghahramani, 2016; Le Cun et al., 
1989; Srivastava et al., 2014; Wan et al., 2013), the degradation 
of any output is gradual, and often proportionate with the mass 
of deactivated nodes but varying with their identity in a com-
plex manner that precludes the identification of a “critical” node, 
or even a clear ranking of the material contribution of 
individual nodes. Note the architectural scale of deactivation need 
not be eloquent either, for breaks in the hierarchy—observed in 
the brain and exploited in residual networks (He et al., 2016)—
potentially allow entire layers to drop out without penalty (Huang 
et al., 2016). Causality is constitutionally distributed in a way 
any conventional description simply cannot capture; only a 
causal field specification will do (Mackie, 1974).
The widespread use of drop-out in the deep-learning litera-
ture shows causally distributed architectures learn complex 
input-output transformations better than other systems exam-
ined to date (Goodfellow et al., 2016). They are also more 
robust to damage, an important consideration for any biologi-
cal system. However, there is no need to appeal to plausibility in 
our argument: to the extent that a node contributes to function it 
must be causally relevant. It is inconceivable that the observed 
complexity of real neural systems is merely epiphenomenal to 
a much simpler underlying causal organisation. In any event, 
since we cannot assume the minimal causal field is small, 
we need to consider how to model it when it is irreducibly large.
Mapping causal fields
In seeking to understand the causality of any complex system, 
we must distinguish between causally relevant and incidental 
variation. Though rarely acknowledged, the approach to mak-
ing such a distinction depends critically on a cardinal assumption 
about a system’s structure. If we assume the organisation of 
a particular brain network is fundamentally the same across 
people—i.e. it is monomorphous—individual variation may 
be treated as noise. The population mean will then be the 
best available guide to the fundamental mechanism and to 
its expression in individuals. This is an implicit assumption 
behind the vast majority of studies in cognitive neuroscience 
where a set of estimates, derived from a small group, are con-
sidered to reveal general truths about the brain. But if, at some 
causally critical level, the neural organisation is not the same 
across people—i.e. it is polymorphous—individual variation 
cannot be treated as noise and the population mean will be a 
poor guide, both to mechanism and individual behaviour (see 
Figure 3) (Thiebaut de Schotten & Shallice, 2017). The dis-
tinction between monomorphous and polymorphous organisa-
tion is crucial because it radically alters the optimal inferential 
approach. We suggest the common assumption of a monomor-
phous architecture of the brain is unjustified—both empirically 
and theoretically—and must be discarded, for the following 
reasons.
The genetic information gap
A neural architecture can be shared across individuals only as 
far as it is identically specified by the genome, the environ-
ment, and their interaction. The constitutive variability of the 
environment leaves the genome as the primary driver of inter- 
individual homology. Genomic information content is informa-
tion theoretically limited by the number of base pairs and the range 
of nucleotide options at each locus. If we implausibly (Rands 
et al., 2014) assume every locus is both functional and 
material to the operations of the brain, so that no section is 
redundant, we have only ~6 x 109 bits of information, roughly 
the content of an old compact disc. Even if all this informa-
tion is used to specify the minimal causal field of a human brain, 
leaving none for the rest of the body, we remain unable to meet 
even the most conservative estimates of the brain’s complex-
ity. A commonly offered prenatal estimate, ~1014 bits, derived 
from the number of synapses in the brain (Huttenlocher & 
Dabholkar, 1997; Tang et al., 2001), implausibly assumes a 
synapse can only encode one bit at any one time, and that neu-
ral connectivity is the only differentiator. This is equivalent 
to treating a neuron rather like a transistor in a modern compu-
ter-processing unit, distinguished from its neighbours only by 
the role assigned to it. In short, we are not faced with an infor-
mation gap but more an information chasm. The conclusion is 
that a great deal of the functional architecture of the brain 
cannot be monomorphous, for the necessary information simply is 
not there.
Creating polymorphous architectures
The brain cannot violate the laws of physics, so how can 
complexity arise from so relatively impoverished an initial 
specification? Theoretically the simplest approach is to inject 
randomness (Matsuoka, 1992) at the outset of development, 
allowing a complex order to emerge downstream through 
feedback learning.
Such stochastic initiation is evident in normal neural devel-
opment, where as many cells face an orchestrated death, at 
great structural and energetic cost to the organism, as survive 
into adulthood (Lossi & Merighi, 2003). Seemingly playing a 
compound game of “Russian roulette cum musical chairs”, 
developing neurons are subjected to an environmentally depend-
ent selection process, determined only once development 
is in play. The process is not fully specified in the genome, 
or else the redundant neurons would never be born. The 
biologically dominant prohibition of regeneration in the central 
nervous system, far from being mysterious, is necessary where 
the organising information emerges during development, and is 
therefore stored only in the final product itself.
Equally, the ubiquity of neural feedback learning is evident in 
the way recurrence is so densely woven into the neural fabric. 
One-way brain pathways are an exception, not the rule (Bressler 
& Menon, 2010). It could not be otherwise, for learning—here 
neural learning—is the only way an order more complex than 
the initial genetic specifications could conceivably arise.
Now a stochastically-initiated, feedback-learning system, with 
multiple tuneable parameters, will inevitably have many different 
solutions for the same target input/output transformation. 
It is therefore bound to be polymorphous. Crucially, there 
need be no mechanism for regularising such solutions across 
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Figure 3. Monomorphous vs polymorphous systems. Where the fundamental architecture of a biological system is the same, our 
best guide will be the simple mean of the population, for each individual will differ from it randomly. Studying such monorphous systems 
is illustrated by adding random noise to an image of a specific watch mechanism, and then averaging across 45 noisy instances. The 
underlying architecture is thereby easily revealed. Where the solution in each individual differs locally, illustrated by taking a family of 45 
different watch mechanisms of the same brand, the population mean is a very poor guide, for individual variability is no longer noise 
but the outcome of a plurality of comparably good solutions. We must instead define local regularities of organisation, here done by t 
stochastic neighbour embedding of the images into a two dimensional latent space, revealing characteristic features of each family of 
solutions. Given that neural systems are complex, stochastically initiated, and optimised by feedback, polymorphous architectures are likely 
to dominate, mandating a data-driven, neighbourhood-defining approach to modelling.
individuals to impose a higher, species-level order, for no such 
order need exist, even if it could be imposed. An organism 
adapts its structure in response to errors only within its own 
input-output transformations, not those of others; biology does 
not do federated learning (McMahan et al., 2016).
Though our concern is to define the bounds of biological pos-
sibility our models must be able to cover, it is natural to seek 
empirical evidence of biological plausibility. The only credible 
evidence can come from a system that has been comprehen-
sively characterised. Since our claim is about under-estimating 
complexity, we may as well pick a simple one. Consider, the 
gut of the lobster, or rather the stomatogastric sub-circuit, 
meticulously studied for decades by Eve Marder. Though 
absurdly simple anatomically, with only 30 neurons, and physi-
ologically, with only regular peristaltic oscillation, the relation 
between the two is not only complex, but also polymorphous 
in precisely the way described. The same functional physi-
ology can be arrived at from different individual neuronal 
“settings”, both across time in the same animal and across 
different animals (Marder & Bucher, 2007). We cannot presume 
that the rules of human functional brain organisation are any 
simpler.
Modelling polymorphous systems
We must confront the functional complexity of neural organi-
sation before us if translation from mechanisms of disease 
to rational treatments is to be possible. How do we generate, 
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estimate, and validate polymorphous neural models of 
potentially incomprehensible complexity? 
Before we descend into the details, let us sketch out a general 
approach. Although a polymorphous system may be so complex 
that no individual is like any other, it is reasonable to expect a set 
of similarities or “family resemblances” from which the prop-
erties of unseen individuals can be inferred. That the population 
mean is an inadequate guide does not imply the centroid of the 
local neighbourhood is not informative. Our task is to characterise 
the biological terrain, at a granularity the data themselves compel, 
so that we may describe each individual in terms of membership 
of a characteristic neighbourhood. Neither the terrain, nor the 
dimensionality of the space it occupies, are known, and must be 
determined empirically and computationally. In essence, we must 
move from models that assume a low-dimensional population 
mean is our best guide, to models that discover a set of high- 
dimensional neighbourhoods that best describe each individual.
Model validation
Let us begin with the last step first: validation. It is conventional 
to take goodness-of-fit, qualified by some statistical measure, 
as evidence for the plausibility and utility of a model. But this is 
of little use where the field of possible models is both vast and 
sparsely sampled. That our model shows a degree of fit with the 
data means little if uncountable very different models fit just as 
well or better. The practice is kin with awarding oneself a gold 
medal after finishing a race blind to the rest of the field. Nor 
is limited model comparison acceptable, for differentiating 
between a handful of models tells us little about the sea of 
possibilities from which they are drawn.
Rather, we need to quantify the individual predictive power 
of a model, across time or across individuals, in relation to 
the future state of a system, or some outcome measure of inter-
est. Such prediction is naturally framed in standard terms 
of sensitivity and specificity, derived from a comprehensive 
spread of data the model has not seen (Dwork et al., 2015; 
Vapnik, 1998). A model with perfect predictive power 
cannot be improved upon, so its competitors may be reasonably 
dismissed. A model with imperfect predictive power is to be 
stratified by metrics, leaving as much or as little room for 
exploring others as its performance dictates.
Crucially, if a given model is powerfully predictive, none of 
the constituent features can be treated as noise, no matter how 
random they may appear when viewed in isolation. This approach 
does not implicate any individual constituent feature mecha-
nistically, because functionally irrelevant incidentals (data 
and/or features) may drive prediction, like correlation. But it 
does imply no component feature leading to a good prediction can 
be safely ignored.
Of course, the richer the parameterisation of a model, the 
more susceptible it is to “overfitting” - the identification of 
coincidences of features in a dataset arising by chance with no 
predictive power beyond it (Hawkins, 2004). But that is no more 
reason for avoiding such an approach than the possibility of 
being dazzled is reason for keeping one’s eyes permanently 
shut. It is in any event a practical, not a theoretical objection, 
addressable through the use of large-scale, fully inclusive 
datasets and high performance computing, as we discuss below.
Model generation and estimation
To insist on intuiting a hypothesis as the first investigative 
step imposes a bias towards models couched in familiar 
concepts within a contemporary sphere of comfort. Where the 
hypothesis space is too large for our imaginations to traverse 
confidently, relying on intuition is not principled but hubristic. 
We need a formal hypothesis generation step, explicitly driven 
by exploratory analysis of data at sufficient scale and with 
adequate dimensional richness. The optimal scale and dimen-
sionality will vary unknowably with any specific problem, but 
since both are likely to be very large, practical feasibility shall 
generally be the limit (Ghahramani, 2015).
The manner of model generation constrains subsequent model 
estimation. If the former requires high dimensionality so will 
the latter. We cannot assume the underlying causal field to be 
sparse, or that its components will be linearly separable. In 
attempting to compress the dimensionality of models—explic-
itly through the use of a feature selection step, or implicitly 
through the use of sparsity-promoting inferential methods—
we need to watch the impact on individual predictive power, 
assessed over a sufficiently diverse sample. Where a smooth 
decrement in prediction performance is seen with feature reduc-
tion, the underlying system is likely to be polymorphous, and 
aggressive feature selection is likely to be counter-productive. 
Equally, we cannot reliably rank input features taken in 
isolation on their marginal contribution to predictability, for 
this necessarily ignores their interactions (Dramiński et al., 
2008).
In short, models need to be complex enough to be tractable only 
with the highest capacity inferential architectures, such as the 
neurally inspired forms that have so rapidly grown to dominate 
the field of machine learning, notably in vision research. As in 
that case, this conclusion reveals two crucial problems, namely 
sensitivity to data scale and interpretability, both widely dis-
cussed in the literature (e.g. (Bzdok & Yeo, 2017)). Rather than 
rehearse the familiar difficulties they present, here we draw 
attention to a few unexpected possibilities they reveal.
The blessing of dimensionality
We have seen that complex, polymorphous systems require 
irreducibly many variables to achieve individually meaning-
ful predictions. The resultant expansion of the parameter space 
under-determines models in proportion to the small scale of 
commonly available data. This familiar curse of dimensionality 
(Vapnik, 1998) makes good solutions hard to find and even harder 
to generalize, for the risk of purely accidental fits increases 
with the number of parameters.
But we should recognise that dimensionality also carries a 
blessing. Consider the parameterisations of contrasting dimen-
sionality shown in Figure 1. Such individualisation as our 
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low-dimensional parameterisation may achieve—here the inter-
ocular distance—will be strongly dependent on the precision of 
measurement, for everyone is differentiated along a single dimen-
sion. In contrast, with a high-dimensional parameterisation—such 
as a crudely pixelated rendition of the image—the precision of 
each individual variable is much less important, for the sig-
nal is conveyed in the covariance across variables. Crucially, 
since the structure of the underlying high-dimensional pattern is 
unlikely to resemble instrumental or other sources of noise, we 
can achieve greater individualisation with lower quality data. 
This is intuitively obvious in our ability to recognize faces from 
noisy, low-resolution images, robust not only to affine trans-
forms of the data such as contrast, zoom, and skew, but also to 
fairly complex non-linear distortions.
The conventional resistance to using routinely acquired data 
on the grounds of noise and heterogeneity is only justified 
where the analysis is low dimensional. When measuring (say) 
total grey matter volume, it matters that one scanner will gener-
ate consistently greater estimates compared with another. But 
when extracting the high-dimensional variation of grey matter 
concentration across the brain, such effects will drop out as 
irrelevant affine shifts that leave the complex, individuating 
covariance patterns intact.
Perhaps the most important objection to high-dimensional 
modelling—the scale of the data required—is thus address-
able through collections for another purpose, obtained outside a 
research environment. In the domain of structural brain imaging, 
the obvious source is clinical imaging (Frackowiak & Markram, 
2015). Since brain imaging is carried out to resolve diagnos-
tic uncertainty towards normality almost as often as away from 
it, such data need not be restricted to the realm of pathology. 
Similarly, though smartphones may fall short of the precision 
of dedicated psychophysical devices, their ubiquity and 
critical mediating role in life enable the collection of rich, 
high-dimensional data on a vast scale (Teki et al., 2016).
Of course, the correct balance between data size and data qual-
ity is an empirical question, to be settled case-by-case. But we 
cannot assume the former must be gated by the latter, and 
discount a high-dimensional approach simply because a conven-
tional psychophysical laboratory cannot scale to thousands of 
participants. Rather, we must reconsider what we actually need to 
know, and what human activity may collaterally disclose it.
Living with opacity
What use are high-dimensional models if they are too 
complex to understand? Where outcomes are highly variable, 
as is the norm in cognitive neurology, prediction is clinically 
invaluable, not simply because patients are consoled by accurate 
prognosis but because interventions need to be guided by their 
individually predicted responses. If a “black box” predic-
tor is the best guide to a correct choice of treatment actuarially, 
it would be difficult to justify not following it merely because its 
operations cannot be paraphrased in intelligible prose.
Moreover, clinical interventions are already primarily driven 
by “black boxes” - the contents of our heads are a good exam-
ple. To give a reason for acting is not to specify a cause or 
to imply an underlying causal model, it is kin with point-
ing to a latent variable. It is only rarely, where very simple 
biological systems are concerned, never in the brain, that we have 
a perspicuous, mechanistic explanatory model available. That 
a human expert can cite a reason for his actions does not 
make his decision-making less opaque than that of a synthetic 
counterpart.
If a system requires a complex model to describe it, then it is 
complex. Translational science needs to adjust to this emo-
tionally, not hopelessly attempt to change it intellectually. A 
causal field so intricate it can only be specified as an artificial 
neural network with a million parameters is explanatory, even if 
its incomprehensibility makes us hesitate to use a word stronger 
than predictive. We can no more hope to understand the brain 
shackled to simple, linear models, than a literary critic could 
hope to understand Shakespeare applying the basic rules of 
grammar alone.
Concluding remarks
Until a decade ago, the foregoing analysis would have been 
unbearably nihilistic, for we had neither the data nor the 
computational tools to realise the alternative it urges. The ground 
is still new and uncertain, yet to be proven capable of support-
ing the structure we argue it is imperative we begin to erect on 
it. But if we wish to move beyond discussions of tractability or 
feasibility into translatable action, we must confront the single 
most striking fact about the brain - its immense complexity.
The difficulties are all the greater for being distributed across 
many intellectual, technological, even political domains, reach-
ing deep into the foundations of the very notion of biological 
understanding. A cognitive neuroscience recast in the form we 
propose will have more in common with meteorology than horol-
ogy. If so, then it will be because the fundamental nature of the 
brain has compelled it, for what we urge here above all is 
to let the data, not our own brains, speak first. And if effec-
tive prediction supplants defective understanding as a result, 
those outside the field, whose lives cognitive neuroscience 
and cognitive neurology seek ultimately to serve, will appreciate 
the exchange.
Data availability
No data is associated with this article.
Grant information
PN is funded by a Health Innovation Challenge Fund award 
(HICF-R9-501, WT-103709) and the UCLH NIHR Biomedical 
Research Centre. 
The funders had no role in study design, data collection and 
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Page 8 of 15
F1000Research 2019, 7:620 Last updated: 02 JAN 2019
 Adolphs R: Human Lesion Studies in the 21st Century. Neuron. 2016; 90(6): 
1151–1153.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text | Free Full Text 
 Bressler SL, Menon V: Large-scale brain networks in cognition: emerging 
methods and principles. Trends Cogn Sci. 2010; 14(6): 277–290.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Bzdok D, Yeo BTT: Inference in the age of big data: Future perspectives on 
neuroscience. NeuroImage. 2017; 155: 549–564.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Chang L, Tsao DY: The Code for Facial Identity in the Primate Brain. Cell. 2017; 
169(6): 1013–1028.e14.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Dramiński M, Rada-Iglesias A, Enroth S, et al.: Monte Carlo feature selection for 
supervised classification. Bioinformatics. 2008; 24(1): 110–117.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Dwork C, Feldman V, Hardt M, et al.: STATISTICS. The reusable holdout: 
Preserving validity in adaptive data analysis. Science. 2015; 349(6248):  
636–638.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Frackowiak R, Markram H: The future of human cerebral cartography: a novel 
approach. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2015; 370(1668): pii: 20140171. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text | Free Full Text 
 Gal Y, Ghahramani Z: Dropout as a Bayesian Approximation: Representing 
Model Uncertainty in Deep Learning. In PMLR. 2016; 1050–1059. [Accessed 
June 5, 2017]. 
Reference Source
 Ghahramani Z: Probabilistic machine learning and artificial intelligence. Nature. 
2015; 521(7553): 452–459.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Goodfellow I, Bengio Y, Courville A: Deep Learning. MIT Press, 2016.  
Reference Source
 Hacker PMS: Human Nature: The Categorial Framework. John Wiley & Sons. 2007.  
Reference Source
 Hawkins DM: The problem of overfitting. J Chem Inf Comput Sci. 2004; 44(1): 
1–12.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 He K, Zhang X, Ren S, et al.: Identity mappings in deep residual networks. In 
European conference on computer vision (Springer). 2016; 630–645. 
Publisher Full Text
 Huang G, Sun Y, Liu Z, et al.: Deep networks with stochastic depth. In European 
Conference on Computer Vision (Springer). 2016; 646–661. 
Publisher Full Text
 Huttenlocher PR, Dabholkar AS: Regional differences in synaptogenesis in 
human cerebral cortex. J Comp Neurol. 1997; 387(2): 167–178.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Le Cun Y, Denker JS, Solla SA: Optimal Brain Damage. In Proceedings of the 
2Nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. NIPS’ 89. 
(Cambridge, MA USA: MIT Press), 1989; 598–605.  
Reference Source
 LeCun Y, Bengio Y, Hinton G: Deep learning. Nature. 2015; 521(7553): 436–444. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Lossi L, Merighi A: In vivo cellular and molecular mechanisms of neuronal 
apoptosis in the mammalian CNS. Prog Neurobiol. 2003; 69(5): 287–312. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Mackie JL: The Cement of the Universe. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974. 
Reference Source
 Marder E, Bucher D: Understanding circuit dynamics using the stomatogastric 
nervous system of lobsters and crabs. Annu Rev Physiol. 2007; 69: 291–316. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Matsuoka K: Noise injection into inputs in back-propagation learning. IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. 1992; 22(3): 436–440.  
Publisher Full Text 
 McMahan HB, Moore E, Ramage D, et al.: Communication-Efficient Learning of 
Deep Networks from Decentralized Data. arXiv: 1602.05629 [cs]. 2016. [Accessed 
May 13, 2018].  
Reference Source
 Parkhi OM, Vedaldi A, Zisserman A: Deep Face Recognition. In BMVC. 2015; 6. 
Publisher Full Text 
 Qureshi AI, Mendelow AD, Hanley DF: Intracerebral haemorrhage. Lancet. 2009; 
373(9675): 1632–1644.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text | Free Full Text 
 Rands CM, Meader S, Ponting CP, et al.: 8.2% of the Human genome is 
constrained: variation in rates of turnover across functional element classes 
in the human lineage. PLoS Genet. 2014; 10(7): e1004525.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text | Free Full Text 
 Rissanen J: Modeling by shortest data description. Automatica. 1978; 14(5): 
465–471.  
Publisher Full Text 
 Rorden C, Karnath HO: Using human brain lesions to infer function: a relic from 
a past era in the fMRI age? Nat Rev Neurosci. 2004; 5(10): 813–819.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Schroff F, Kalenichenko D, Philbin J: FaceNet: A Unified Embedding for Face 
Recognition and Clustering. 2015; 815–823. [Accessed December 7, 2016]. 
Publisher Full Text 
 Srivastava N, Hinton G, Krizhevsky A, et al.: Dropout: A Simple Way to Prevent 
Neural Networks from Overfitting. J Mach Learn Res. 2014; 15: 1929–1958. 
Reference Source
 Tang Y, Nyengaard JR, De Groot DM, et al.: Total regional and global number 
of synapses in the human brain neocortex. Synapse. 2001; 41(3): 258–273. 
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Teki S, Kumar S, Griffiths TD: Large-Scale Analysis of Auditory Segregation 
Behavior Crowdsourced via a Smartphone App. PLoS One. 2016; 11(4): 
e0153916.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text | Free Full Text 
 Thiebaut de Schotten M, Shallice T: Identical, similar or different? Is a single 
brain model sufficient? Cortex. 2017; 86: 172–175.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text
 Vapnik V: Statistical learning theory. Wiley. 1998.  
Reference Source
 Wan L, Zeiler M, Zhang S, et al.: Regularization of Neural Networks using 
DropConnect. 2013; 1058–1066. [Accessed June 5, 2017].  
Reference Source
 Wardlaw JM, Warlow CP, Counsell C: Systematic review of evidence on 
thrombolytic therapy for acute ischaemic stroke. Lancet. 1997; 350(9078): 
607–614.  
PubMed Abstract | Publisher Full Text 
 Zhou E, Cao Z, Yin Q: Naive-Deep Face Recognition: Touching the Limit of LFW 
Benchmark or Not? arXiv: 1501.04690 [cs]. 2015.  
Reference Source
References
Page 9 of 15
F1000Research 2019, 7:620 Last updated: 02 JAN 2019
 Open Peer Review
  Current Referee Status:
Version 1








































Page 10 of 15













































Page 11 of 15



















From Neurons to Neuroimaging. . 2018;   (2): 257-273   |   Neuron 99 PubMed Abstract Publisher Full Text
2. Arbabshirani M, Plis S, Sui J, Calhoun V: Single subject prediction of brain disorders in neuroimaging:
Promises and pitfalls.  . 2017;  : 137-165   NeuroImage 145 Publisher Full Text
3. Bzdok D, Yeo BTT: Inference in the age of big data: Future perspectives on neuroscience. .Neuroimage
2017;  : 549-564   |   155 PubMed Abstract Publisher Full Text
4. Woo CW, Chang LJ, Lindquist MA, Wager TD: Building better biomarkers: brain models in translational
neuroimaging. . 2017;   (3): 365-377   |   Nat Neurosci 20 PubMed Abstract Publisher Full Text
5. Aisa B, Mingus B, O'Reilly R: The emergent neural modeling system. . 2008;   (8):Neural Netw 21




memory in the hippocampus. . 2013;   (6144): 387-91   |   Science 341 PubMed Abstract Publisher Full Text
8. Gabrieli JDE, Ghosh SS, Whitfield-Gabrieli S: Prediction as a humanitarian and pragmatic contribution
from human cognitive neuroscience. . 2015;   (1): 11-26   |   Neuron 85 PubMed Abstract Publisher Full Text
Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?
Yes
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Partly
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Partly




Page 12 of 15
F1000Research 2019, 7:620 Last updated: 02 JAN 2019
 I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that











































Page 13 of 15
F1000Research 2019, 7:620 Last updated: 02 JAN 2019
  No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
 19 June 2018Referee Report
https://doi.org/10.5256/f1000research.16353.r34258















. 2017;  : 172-175   |   Cortex 86 PubMed Abstract Publisher Full Text
Is the topic of the opinion article discussed accurately in the context of the current literature?
Yes
Are all factual statements correct and adequately supported by citations?
Yes
Are arguments sufficiently supported by evidence from the published literature?
Yes
Are the conclusions drawn balanced and justified on the basis of the presented arguments?
Yes
 No competing interests were disclosed.Competing Interests:
I have read this submission. I believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that








Page 14 of 15











Page 15 of 15
F1000Research 2019, 7:620 Last updated: 02 JAN 2019
